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Abstract: What would happen to our understanding of international law and its relationship with 
violence if we collapsed the distinction between our supposedly post-colonial ‘present’ and its 
colonial ‘past’; between the sovereign spaces of the twenty-first century global order, and the 
integrated, hierarchical space of fascist imperialism? I respond to this question through an 
investigation into the physical contours of a precise ‘imperial location’: 30°31'00"N, 18°34'00"E. 
These coordinates refer to a point on the sea-edge of the Sirtica that is occupied, today, by the Ra’s 
Lanuf oil refinery, one of Libya’s three most important such facilities. In the late-1930s, however, 
during Libya’s period of fascist colonial rule, this was the spot at which a state-of-the-art motorway, 
the Via litoranea libica, was crossed by a giant triumphal arch, the Arco dei Fileni. Through a 
chronotopic reading of the temporal, spatial and interpellative aspects of this point, its architecture 
and its history, I suggest that fascist lawyers, officials and intellectuals accepted an unfortunate truth 
about the relationship between international law and violence – a relationship that twenty-first century 
doctrinal international law is loath to confront. This truth concerns the inherently expansionist logic 
of the sovereign state, and the inevitably hierarchical ordering of the ‘international community’ which 
stems from it. 
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Fascism, Imperialism and International Law:   




Full Name: Ra’s Lānūf (Approved – A) [Ra’s Lanuf: Variant – V]  
Primary Country Code: LY (Libya) 
Region Font Code (RC): 3 (Africa/Middle East) 
Latitude in degrees, minutes, and seconds: 30°31'00"N 
Longitude in degrees, minutes, and seconds: 18°34'00"E 
Military Grid Reference System (MGRS) coordinates: 34RBU6650278557 
Populated Place Classification (PC): No data.  
US National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, 2018.1 
 
‘[T]he place calls the event to mind.’ 




Scattered about, somewhat incongruously, in an archaeological enclosure not far from the Libyan 
town of Ra’s Lanuf one can find the remains of a triumphal arch. This arch, the Arco dei Fileni, was 
commissioned in 1937 by the Governor-General of Libia Italiana, Italo Balbo, and designed by 
Florestano di Fausto, perhaps the most celebrated of fascist Italy’s colonial architects. One of 
fascism’s most famous monuments, the Arco also straddled one its greatest technological 
achievements,2 the Via litoranea libica – the motorway which ran between its piers just at the point 
where the Tripolitania/Cyrenaica border met the sea-edge of the Sirtica desert: point 30°31'00"N, 
18°34'00"E.  
Completed in the aftermath of the brutal suppression of the Libyan resistance movement 
after two decades of bitter struggle,3 the Litoranea ran for 1,800 km along the entire coastline of the 
colony, from the French protectorate of Tunisia in the west to the British protectorate of Egypt in the 
east. In doing so, it provided Italy with a concrete (in every sense) symbol of its now total control 
over these three recalcitrant North African territories. Viewed in the light of Italy’s merciless 
annexation of the Ethiopian Empire less than a year before,4 contemporary commentators were 
correct to point out that the Litoranea was, in fact, ‘nothing but a military highroad thinly camouflaged 
                                               
1 US National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, at http://geonames.nga.mil/ 
2 J. L. Wright ‘Mussolini, Libya and the Sword of Islam’ in R. Ben-Ghiat & M. Fuller (eds.), Italian Colonialism 
(2005), 121 at 122.  
3 See e.g. A. A. Ahmida The Making of Modern Libya: State Formation, Colonization, and Resistance, 1830-
1932 (1994) 103-40; N. Labanca La Guerra italiana per la Libia, 1911-1931 (2012).  
4 See R. S. Parfitt ‘Empire des nègres blancs: The Hybridity of International Personality and the Abyssinia 
Crisis of 1935-36’, 24 LJIL (2011) 849-872.  
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as a road to encourage the motoring tourist’.5 The Arch complemented this monumentalisation of 
Italy’s hard-won domination over Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Fezzan. These three historically 
separate and culturally distinct territories had first been sized by (liberal) Italy in the Italo-Ottoman 
War of 1911-1912. However, the latter’s hold, particularly over Fezzan, had remained tenuous. It 
was the fascist administration which in 1934 merged them together officially into a single colony 
known as Italian North Africa, or ‘Italian Libya’.6  
The Arco was unveiled on 16 March 1937 in a grand ceremony to mark the opening of the 
Litoranea – a ceremony presided over by Mussolini himself. And there it stood, with only the whistling 
of the ghibli winds for company, for nearly 40 years – the only visible structure for miles around. The 
Litoranea (now better known as the Libyan Coastal Highway or اﻟﻠﯾﺑﻲ  اﻟﺳﺎﺣﻠﻲ  اﻟطرﯾق ) is still in use – 
primarily by tank trucks and other traffic, or more commonly by the battered Toyota pickups favoured 
by the various militia which have been struggling, since 2011, to gain control over the area, home to 
some of the largest oilfields in the world, and in particular over the gigantic Ra’s Lanuf refinery which 
now dominates the landscape. For the Arco is today no more, having been blown up in 1974 by 
Muammar Qaddafi, then Revolutionary Chairman of the Libyan Arab Republic. All that remains to 
mark the spot at which it once crossed the motorway are traces of its concrete foundations, which 
(at least in 2009) could still ‘just be made out in the road surface, close to the west end of the one of 
the airstrips at Ra’s Lanuf’.7  
The conflict over this small area of land, now home to Libya’s third-largest oil refinery, has 
been fierce ever since the revolution which ousted Qaddafi in October 2011. The Ra’s Lanuf refinery 
has changed hands many times – first passing from ‘regime loyalists’ to ‘rebel forces’ backed by 
NATO airstrikes authorised (under UN Security Council 1973 of March 2011) to enforce the 
international community’s ‘responsibility to protect’ Libyan civilians;8 then, from August 2014 
onwards, from one rival faction to another in Libya’s increasingly complex and violent civil war. Most 
recently, these factions have included the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (IS), which took control 
of the facility in January 2016, setting fire to four of its storage tanks; the once official, now rogue 
Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG) which ousted IS; the ‘Operation Dignity’ forces of the Libyan 
National Army (LNA), commanded by General Khalifa Haftar, which ousted the PFG,9 and the 
Defence of Benghazi Brigades, with whom Dignity forces continue to spar.10  
Some of these factions are allied with one of Libya’s three rival governments: the General 
National Congress (GNC) established in 2012 in Tripoli (now a rump organisation known as the 
                                               
5 M. H. H. MacCartney & P. Cremona Italy’s Foreign and Colonial Policy, 1914-1937 (1938) 4.  
6 P. Kenrick Tripolitania (2009) 154. 
7 Ibid., at 156.  
8 UN Doc. S/RES/1973 (2011), para. 1. See A. Orford, ‘What Kind of Law is This? LRB Blog, 29 Mar. 2011; 
ibid, International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect (2011).  
9 ‘Dignity Operation Forces Recapture Ras Lanuf Oil Port,’ Libya Observer, 14 Mar. 2017. 




Government of National Salvation); the rival House of Representatives which fled to Tobruk in mid-
2014 after members of the original GNC rejected the results of the June 2014 elections; and the 
Government of National Accord established in December 2015 under the UN-brokered ‘Skhirat 
Agreement’, now also based in Tripoli.11 For example, Hafta’s LNA is (generally) supported by the 
House of Representatives – in theory (not in practice) the legislative arm of the GNA. Many of these 
militias also have external backing. For instance, in September 2016, Dignity forces seized back 
control of the refinery from the PFG supported by Egyptian and UAE airstrikes,12 and Russia is 
liaising with Haftar directly,13 in spite the latter’s vociferous opposition to the Skhirat Agreement.14 
The US has been launching regular airstrikes in Libya against ‘IS militants’ since August 2016.15 In 
the midst of this confusion of conflicting jurisdictional claims and aerial bombardment, it is difficult to 









Figure 1: The Arco dei Fileni and the Via litoranea libica. Nazi propaganda image, 23 Sep. 1940.  
Photo: Berliner Verlag/Archiv © DPA Picture Alliance/Alamy Stock Photo.  
 
So, what are scholars of international law to make of the fact that these two structures – on 
the one hand, a monument to the opening of a road symbolising the integration and militarisation of 
a fascist colony on the one hand; on the other, an oil refinery at the centre of a civil conflict which 
                                               
11 See M. Fitzgerald & M. Toaldo, A Quick Guide to Libya’s Main Players, European Council for Foreign 
Relations, at www.ecfr.edu 
12 ‘Foreign Airstrikes Rescue Dignity Operation Militias Again’, Libya Observer, 18 Sep. 2016.  
13 M. Tsvetkova, ‘Exclusive: Russian Private Security Firm says it had Armed Men in East Libya’, Reuters, 11 
Mar. 2017. 
14 A. al-Warfalli, ‘East Libyan Commander Haftar says UN-Backed Government Obsolete, Hints may Run in 
Elections’, Reuters, 17 Dec. 2017. 
15 E Schmitt, ‘Under Trump, U.S. Launched 8 Airstrikes Against ISIS in Libya. It Disclosed 4’, New York 
Times, 8 Mar. 2018. 
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has erupted in the wake of an international intervention executed by the self-styled agents of 
humanity’s ‘protection’ – occurred, more than eight decades apart, in exactly the same ‘location’? 
The answer is not straightforward.  
On the one hand, international law’s core doctrines are inclined to assure us that this is 
nothing but a coincidence: 30°31'00"N, 18°34'00"E (1937) and 30°31'00"N, 18°34'00"E (today) might 
be identical in spatial terms, these doctrines suggest, but time holds them safely apart. To give just 
a few illustrations, the doctrine of sovereign equality (as rearticulated in Resolution 1973) insists that 
international law is founded on a ‘strong commitment’ to the ‘sovereignty, independence, territorial 
integrity and national unity’ of all states.16 Similarly, the doctrine of the non-use of force is often traced 
to the defeat of official fascism in 1945, together with its efforts to justify the use of force on the basis 
of the need for spazzio vitale or Lebensraum (‘living space’).17 Equally, the emergence of the now-
customary right of ‘all peoples’ to self-determination in the 1960s and 70s is understood to have 
rendered colonialism unlawful in much the same way as fascist expansionism did.18 As these 
illustrations indicate, from a doctrinal perspective the progress of international law away from 
territorial expansionism (whether fascist or colonial) and towards sovereign equality has been such 
that the ‘present’ conflict in Libya (an independent state since 1951) can be assumed to be wholly 
unconnected with the ‘historical’ phenomenon of fascist imperialism.19  
On the other hand, however, our faith (as scholars of international law) in the idea that 
international law’s trajectory will inevitably be ‘progressive’ is not what it once was. Official bodies 
like the International Court of Justice continue to go about their work of deriving the current state of 
international law from the sources laid down by Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute. Yet that method has 
been subjected to a thoroughgoing critique in recent years. That critique has taken on an important 
temporal dimension, with scholars seeking not only to contextualise international law’s ‘evolution’ 
(for example, by drawing out the discipline’s colonial origins) but also to bring those ‘past’ origins to 
bear on international law’s ostensibly post-colonial ‘present’.20 With this, critical scholars are 
increasingly challenging both the teleological temporality of doctrinal international law (the idea that 
the more international law we have, the better the world will be) and the historicist temporality of 
mainstream history (generally suspicious of any effort that might be construed as sullying the 
                                               
16 Res. 1973, supra note 8, Preamble 
17 1945 Charter of the United Nations 1 UNTS XVI, Art. 2(4); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), Merits, Judgment of 27 June 1986, [1984] ICJ Rep. 1986 at 
14, para. 188. See e.g. M. E. O’Connel, ‘Peace and War’, in B. Fassbender & A. Peters (eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of the History of International Law (2012), 272 at 291.  
18 UN Doc. A/RES/1514(XV) (1960); Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South 
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory 
Opinion of 21 Jun. 1971, ICJ Rep. 1971 at 16, para 52. 
19 See e.g. A. Cassese, International Law 2nd ed. (2005), 37; M. N. Shaw, International Law, 5th ed. 2003), 
30; P. Malanczuk, Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law,7th Ed. (1997), 25.  
20 See e.g. A. Anghie Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (2004); G. Simpson 




remnants of yesterday with the concerns of today).21 From the perspective of this new, critical 
international legal temporality – far more elastic than either of its linear (teleological and historicist) 
counterparts – to insist that two events are necessarily held apart by a distinction between ‘past’ and 
‘present’ is, indeed, a product of ideology.22 The same, indeed, might be said about the spatiality of 
international law. Where the doctrine tends to narrate the division of the world into a series of formally 
equal states simply as a fact of life, if not as an inevitable and inherently emancipatory development, 
critical scholars of international law, and Indigenous scholars in particular, have challenged this 
assumption that statehood is a neutral, natural and universal way to organise collective life.23  
Building on this body of scholarship, the question I want to explore in this essay is what would 
happen if we were to collapse the distinction between the (post-colonial) ‘present’ and (colonial) 
‘past’ – and between ‘sovereign’ and ‘imperial’ space – in relation, specifically, to fascist colonialism? 
My jumping-off point, here, concerns the situation, both paradoxical and catastrophic, which began 
to unfold with the passage of Resolution 1973, under the aegis of which the ‘international community’ 
authorised the sacrifice of (in the end) between 10,000 and 25,000 Libyan lives in the name of their 
own ‘protection’.24 Rather than approaching international legality as something that regulates the 
relations among a set of bounded jurisdictions know as states (together with certain other 
‘international personalities’), I will read international law here as something that can (still) be found 
embedded in, and rebounding from, the physicality of a particular location, contributing to the 
constitution of particular kinds of subjectivity. This location I will examine here is, of course, point 
30°31'00"N, 18°34'00"E, home of the former Arch, of the still-existent Ra’s Lanuf refinery, and of 
their tenacious companion, the Litoranea/Libyan Coastal Highway.  
The approach I develop here in order to respond to this question is at once materialist and 
chronotopic. Regarding the first, I follow my co-contributor Luis Eslava in understanding the 
normative force of international law to be something that operates not only through in its documents 
and institutions, but also through the physical contours of our daily existence: the design of our 
homes; the materials of which our monuments are constructed; animals and vehicles which carry us 
about; the fabric of our clothes; the sandiness or otherwise of our soil.25 Regarding the second, I 
                                               
21 A. Orford, ‘On International Legal Method’, 1 London Review of International Law (2013), 166; R Parfitt 
‘The Spectre of Sources’ 25 EJIL (2014), 297. 
22 See, most famously, C. Schmitt [1950], The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus 
Publicum Europaeum (2006).  
23 See e.g. A. Simpson, Mohawk Interruptus: Political Life Across the Borders of Settler States (2014).   
24 These figures come from Cherif Bassiouni, head of the April 2011 UN Human Rights Council mission to 
Tripoli and rebel-held areas (‘Up to 15,000 Killed in Libya War: UN Rights Expert, Reuters, 10 Jun. 2011) 
and US senator John McCain reporting figures from the National Transitional Council (in Rory Mulholland & 
Jay Deshmukh, ‘Residents flee Gaddafi hometown’, Sydney Morning Herald, 3. Oct. 2011) respectively. See 
Orford, supra note 8; A. Çhubukçhu, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Libya and the Problem of Transnational 
Solidarity’, 12 Journal of Human Rights (2013), 40.  
25 L. Eslava Local Space, Global Life: The Everyday Operation of International Law and Development 
(2015); L. Eslava, ‘The Materiality of International Law: Violence, History and Joe Sacco’s The Great War’, 
London Review of International Law (2017), 49.   
  
 7 
follow the linguistic philosopher and semiotician Mikhail Bakhtin in understanding subjectivity as a 
function of the narrative relationship between time and space.26 Bringing these two approaches 
together, the task of this article will be to work out what kinds of subjects the materiality of point 
30°31'00"N, 18°34'00"E produced in the 1930s, and what kinds of subjects it continues to produce 
today.  In Section 1, I focus on the temporality of this location. In Section 2, I address its spatiality. 
In Section 3, turn to the question of subjectivity. Somewhat disconcertingly, the results produced by 
this approach suggest that fascism’s understanding of self-determining subjectivity (‘sovereignty’) as 
inherently expansionist, hierarchical and violent may have been more accurate than its liberal 
counterpart, more familiar to doctrinal international law today. Uncomfortable as this suggestion may 
be, however, it does a certain kind of light on the otherwise puzzling tendency of an international 
legal order committed to the development of ‘friendly relations among nations based on respect for 
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples’ to promote violence rather than to 
prevent it.27 
 
1. Time.  
As its location and aesthetics proclaimed, the Arco dei Fileni was intended to symbolise Italy’s right 
to traverse, at will, a frontier that was at once political and temporal. Libya’s Cyrenaica-Tripolitania 
boundary had itself been superimposed on top of the ancient border between the Phoenician colony 
of Carthage (founded in 814 or 815 BCE) and the Greek colony of Cyrene (founded in 630 BCE).28 
It was the memory of ancient border that the Arch’s two eponymous figures, cast in bronze and 
lodged in its attic (see Fig. 2), were intended to evoke. The legend of that desert frontier is described 
by the Governor of the Roman colony Africa Nova, Sallust (86-34 BCE) in his famous account, The 
War with Jugurtha. The Phileni twins, two Carthaginians, Sallust relates, had been buried alive after 
patriotically agreeing to give up their lives in order to preserve the more advantageous border they 
had just won in a race against two Cyrenaicans. It is impossible to know, according to Sallust, 
whether the twins lost the race ‘due to sloth or chance’; for ‘in those lands…when the wind rises on 
                                               
26 M. Bakhtin, ‘Forms of Time and the Chronotope in the Novel’ in M. Holquist (ed), The Dialogic Imagination: 
Four Essays by M. M. Bakhtin, trans. C. Emerson & M. Holquist (1981), 84;  M. Bakhtin, ‘The Bildungsroman 
and its Significance in the History of Realism’, in C Emerson & M. Holquist (eds.) Speech Genres and Other 
Late Essays, trans. V. W. McGee (1986), 10. For a more developed account of this methodology, see R. S. 
Parfitt ‘Newer is Truer: Time, Space, and Subjectivity at the Bandung Conference’, in L Eslava, M Fakhri & V 
Nesiah, Bandung, Global History and International Law: Critical Pasts and Pending Futures (2018), 49. For a 
different application, see M. Valverde Chronotopes of Law: Jurisdiction, Scale and Governance (2015). 
27 UN Charter, supra note 17, Art. 1.  




those level and barren plains, it sweeps up the sand from the ground and drives it with such violence 
as to fill the mouth and eyes’.29  
That the governors of the much later colony of Libia Italiana should have chosen an ancient 
name (from the Greek word Λιβύη, Libyē) and ancient myth as the theme of a monument to their 
power is, of course, unsurprising. The willingness of the Mussolini regime to portray Italy as the 
Roman Empire’s rightful inheritor at every available opportunity is well known,30 although it was 
hardly a fascist innovation, as Gabriele D’Annunzio’s blood-spattered poems celebrating the 
Islamophobic carnage of the first ‘Libyan War’ of 1911-12 (see Fig. 3) remind us.31 However, as the 
choice of the legend of the Phileni twins indicated, no less than the eclectic mix of Roman, Pharonic, 
Phoenician and Hellenistic elements that went into the Arch’s design,32 fascist imperialism in Italy 
claimed not only to the legacy of the Roman Empire as its patrimony, but actually to the whole of 
antiquity.   
After Mussolini’s seizure of power in 1922, this temporally expansionist claim came to be 
expressed more obviously in Libya’s built environment. Central to the ‘colonial modern’ architectural 
style which emerged in the late 1920s and early 30s was the concept of Mediterraneanità 
(‘Mediterraneanness’), vigorously discussed in Italian architectural journals during this period.33 As 
the anthropologist and architectural historian Mia Fuller explains, la Mediterraneanità allowed 
architects like di Fausto to incorporate elements of the Arab ‘vernacular’ into their buildings with the 
claim that, far from representing a degrading act of mimesis in relation to a supposedly inferior 
culture, such incorporation spoke, rather, of the ‘conclusion’ of the ‘eternal task of Latinità 
[Latineity]’.34 According to the designer Carlo Enrico Rava, for example, Italian architects working in 
this style were not borrowing from Arab culture but reasserting and ‘perpetuat[ing] the work of Rome, 
creating the new in its traces… [so as to] renew and complete the still primitive local architecture of 
our colony, with all the most modern technical and practical innovations’. They were, he said,  
[t]he fated, centuries-old vessels…of…this eternal Latin spirit…a whole vernacular 
architecture that is typically Latin and belongs to us, that is without age and yet is extremely 
Rational, that is made of white, smooth cubes and large terraces that is Mediterranean and 
solar, seems to be showing us the way to retrieve our most intimate essence as Italians. Our 
                                               
29 G. S. Sallust [86 – c.35 BCE], The War with Jugurtha, 2nd Ed, trans. Bill Thayer (1931), para. 79. See also 
J. Quinn ‘Libya’s Ancient Borders’ LRB Blog, 17 Mar. 2014. 
30 See e.g. P. Melgrani ‘The Cult of the Duce in Mussolini’s Italy’, 11 Journal of Contemporary History (1976), 
221 at 229-30. 
31 See e.g. G. D’Annunzio, ‘La Canzone del sangue’, in A. Andreoli & N. Lorenzini (eds.), Gabriele 
D’Annunzio, Versi d’amore e di gloria, Vol. II (1984), 659. See L. Re ‘Italians and the Invention of Race: The 
Poetics and Politics of Difference in the Struggle over Libya, 1890-1913’, 1 California Italian Studies (2010), 
at 26.  
32 Kenrick, supra note 6, at 154. 
33 M. Fuller, Moderns Abroad: Architecture, Cities and Italian Imperialism (2007), 107-35. 
34 C. E. Rava quoted ibid, 117. 
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race, our culture, our civilization both ancient and new, are Mediterranean: thus it is this 
‘Mediterranean spirit’ that we should seek the characteristic of Italianità [Italianness]…35 
Both in theory and in practice, then, the materiality of daily existence echoed and reflected back the 
legal changes that were being enacted in Libya under the fascist colonial administration – changes 
that included the merciless ‘pacification’ (in 1931) of the Libyan resistance movement, and the joint 
incorporation of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania (though not Fezzan) into the Italian state (in 1939) to 
become its nineteenth region (as in French Algeria).  
The Arco dei Fileni was, of course, hardly the minimalist ‘white, smooth cube’ characteristic 
of the iconic villaggi di colonizzazione then under construction all over Libya (see Fig. 4). Contrasting 
sharply with their emphasis on pure functionality, the Arch displayed, among other decorations, an 
inscription in huge capital letters,36 the enormous bronzes of the Phileni twins ‘evidently writhing in 
distress’,37 and two elaborately carved reliefs.38 In other ways, however, the Arch exemplified at least 
di Fausto’s particular ‘visione mediterranea’,39 as this was embodied in the eclectic (to the point of 
kitsch) style for which his buildings remain famous.40 Standing 30.85m tall, built of concrete (that 
most modernist of materials) and faced with 350 tonnes of travertine (that whitest and most Roman 
of limestones),41 the Arch’s very physicality married the classical and the modern together, allowing 
it to operate as a kind of temporal tunnel between one and the other. This effect was reinforced by 
the fact that it was an arch – that marker of ‘all things classical, powerful, and historically legitimate’,42 
or, in di Fausto’s words, ‘a thing entirely our own’ (as Italians), through which ‘buildings become 
dimensions of the [Italian] spirit’.43 Its rich decorations were, moreover, visible only at close range. 
From any distance, its overwhelming impression (see Fig. 2) would have been one of massive, white, 




                                               
35 C. E. Rava quoted ibid, 105. 
36 From the poet Horace praising the Emperor Augustus: Alme Sol possis nihil Urbe Roma visere maius [‘O 
fostering Sun, may you never see anything greater than the City of Rome’].  
37 Kenrick, supra note 6, at 155. 
38 Ibid. 
39 F. di Fausto ‘Visione mediterranea della mia architettura’, 1 Liba (1937), 16. 
40 Fuller, supra note 33, at 129; B. L. McLaren, ‘Architecture of Tourism in Italian Libya’ in Ben-Ghiat & M. 
Fuller (eds.), supra note 2, 167 at 171-73.  
41 Kenrick, supra note 6, at 154.  
42 Fuller, supra note 33, at 130. 















Figure 2: The Arco dei Fileni. Nazi propaganda image, 1937 © Photo: Sueddeutsche Zeitun/Alamy Stock Photo. 
 
The form of the Arch, then, aimed clearly at underscoring Italy’s claim to these territories 
through the enactment of a fold in the linear sequence of centuries to bring Libya’s periods of 
classical and fascist rule together. But the memorial effect of this temporally twofold imperial 
international order was to obscure another one: that of the Islamic dar al-Islam to which, from the 
seventh century CE until 1912, Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan had been assimilated. In effect, 
the concept of mediterraneità, as expressed in the Arch, wiped out nearly 400 years of Ottoman rule 
and thirteen centuries of Islamic political and territorial authority in Libya.44 In doing so, it gave 
material form to fascism’s colonisation not only of the area traversed by these territories, but of their 
past as well.  
Though hardly ‘functionalist’, the Arco dei Fileni did have a function, however: that of marking 
the border between the two coastal regions which the Litorana Libica hemmed together. When 
observed (as it would have been) in conjunction with this motorway, therefore, the Arch’s otherwise 
retrospective sense of direction must have clashed spectacularly with the road’s undeniably high-
                                               




tech, futuristic orientation. Such an orientation was, of course, no less in keeping with the aesthetics 
and politics of Italian fascism than its neo-classical inclinations. Just as they sought to ‘trim the 
bourgeois fat’ from the bodies and minds of Italians, so the ideologues and institutions of the 
Mussolini regime sought to eliminate all that was ‘barbaric’ and ‘decadent’ about the previous era.45 
The Duce frequently referred, for example, to the ‘stale breath of the past’, ‘exhaled’ by the 
institutions of parliamentary democracy,46 going so far as to recalibrate the calendar to begin on 29 
October 1922, the day after the March on Rome.47 Indeed, as historians of art, in particular, have 
pointed out, far from being a contradiction, this juxtaposition of past and present was a distinctive 
and politically highly-charged element of fascist aesthetics. As the art historian Mark Antliff argues, 
citing many other examples of this combination, fascism’s ‘rejenerative nationalism’ was notably 
‘Janus-faced’:  
[T]o reinvigorate the body politic, fascists looked beyond a decadent present to 
past eras, but they did not advocate a nostalgic return to, say, the era of Imperial 
Rome. Instead, they sought to incorporate qualities associated with past eras into 
the creation of a radically new society, fully integrated with twentieth-century 
industrialism and technology. In Sorelian fashion, selective moments from a 
nation’s historical past were utilized for their mythic appeal as a catalyst for the 
radical transformation of present society.48  
Understood in this physical and historical context, the Litoranea offered one of the most tangible 
symbols of fascism’s self-understanding as the agent of an industrialised, technified, corporatist and 
hence truly modern future. And it was of course in this self-understanding that fascism’s notable debt 
to the art movement known as Futurism was most clearly visible.  
A few years younger than Futurism, whose founding manifesto dates from 1909,49 fascism 
emerged in 1914 into a highly charged political and aesthetic atmosphere already coloured by highly 
disruptive Futurist agitation. Witness, for example, the following account of a speech made in 1913, 
at the conclusion of the Italo-Ottoman War, by Futurism’s leader, Filippo Tommaso Marinetti:  
We want an Italy that is sovereign and absolute! … The word Italy must prevail over the word 
‘freedom’…   
(Applause. Ten minutes of pandemonium)… 
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[A]ll necessary money, brutality, and blood for the vigorous, practical completion of this 
Libyan exploit. This completion is today the colonial Futurism of Italy. I end with the cry of 
‘Libya Forever!’  
(Shouts. Cries of ‘Libya Forever!’ Applause. Indescribable confusion. Arguments, scuffles, 
fisticuffs, punches slaps, invasion by the carabinieri).50  
Although Futurism’s momentum had peaked long before 1937, fascism had by that time appropriated 
– and pastiched – many of Futurism’s most powerful tropes.51 According to the Futurist artist 
Giuseppi Prezzolini, for example, [t]he cult of speed, the attraction to violent solutions…the exaltation 
of exclusively national feelings…all these are emotional attitudes that went from Futurism into 
Fascism without missing a beat.52  
 If one of the Futurists had seen the Arco dei Fileni (and perhaps some of them did), the 
‘passéism’ of its decorative features and the ‘static, grave, oppressive’ character of its ‘pyramidal’ 
form and ‘horizontal lines’ would certainly have filled them with revulsion.53 But the Litoranea 
manifested everything that was beloved to Futurism. It slashed through a desert that had remained 
virtually unchanged since the fifth century BCE,54 and which had until then been traversable only by 
camel, under the guidance of a nomad, that supposed living symbol of civilisational backwardness.55 
The road also decimated the journey-time between Tripoli and Benghazi, replacing the painfully long 
voyage by fortnightly steamer,56 accelerating the redeployment of troops, and bringing ever closer 
the exhilarating prospect of war – ‘the world’s only hygiene’, according to the Futurist mantra.57 
Perhaps most importantly, the Litoranea’s high-speed penetration of the Arch invoked precisely the 
transformative capacity for ‘intuition’ that both Futurism and fascism valued so highly in the 
aggressive, muscular, male subjects of their common imagination.  
The importance of intuition to the political aesthetics of Futurism was articulated most 
explicitly by the painter and sculptor Umberto Boccioni. Drawing heavily on the philosophy of Henri 
Bergson and Georges Sorel, Boccioni argued that it was the capacity to intuit an object’s potential 
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for movement through time and space which distinguished the true (i.e. Futurist) artist.58 For 
example, in his Unique Forms of Continuity in Space (1913), Boccioni sought to express a ‘fourth 
dimension in painting and sculpture’ comprised of the three dimensions of volume together with an 
object’s ‘potential unfolding’ in time, as intuited by the artist.59 The aesthetic gestures which 
expressed this fusion of time and space into a ‘fourth dimension’ aimed explicitly to ‘awaken the 
beholder’s intuitive capacities and actively transform consciousness’.60 ‘In contrast with other 
proponents of the fourth dimension,’ Antliff points out, ‘Boccioni assimilated this spatial concept into 
the Futurists’ highly politicized campaign to renew Italy’:  
The Futurist correlation of the fourth dimension with a Bergsonian spatial-temporal flux made 
up of ‘force forms’ and ‘force lines,’ unfettered by the limitations of three-dimensional space 
or measured ‘clock’ time, fused with a political program premised on intuition and an 
antimaterialist call for national regeneration and imperialist expansion.61  
If any of the Futurists did have the opportunity to zoom through the Arch along Litoranea, they would 
hardly have missed the transformative potential of that experience. The road’s sole purpose was, 
after all, to facilitate the accelerated movement of a mechanised object (ideally a tank) through both 
the space of the ‘uncivilised’ desert and the multiple centuries referenced by the Arch. From a Futurist 
perspective, therefore, the subject-passenger of such a vehicle could not fail to have been 
transfigured into one capable of intuiting – and hence participating in – fascist Italy’s expansionist 
project. 
Finally, of course, the Litoranea symbolised the domination and incorporation of Libya – a 
cause close to Futurism’s heart. Marinetti, for example, had been profoundly impressed by the 
cutting-edge military technologies he witnessed as a war reporter during the Italo-Ottoman War. In 
his La Battaglia di Tripoli, he described Captain Carlo Piazza, history’s first war pilot, singing joyfully 
while spraying ‘rounds of lead into the torrential sea of the enemy army’.62 When, in 1923, Marinetti 
wrote an open letter to the ‘Head of the New Italy’, urging Mussolini to ‘unleash Italian youth… in the 
conquest of an Italian Empire’, he reproduced part of a 1911 manifesto in which he had congratulated 
the (liberal) Italian government on having ‘finally become Futurist’ through its annexation of Libya. 
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‘[O]ur slim peninsula’, he wrote, ‘is swollen with creative genius, and has the right to govern the 
world’.63 
The Litoranea, then, embodied precisely the accelerated expansionism and murderous 
attitude to ‘tradition’ so beloved of Futurism, and so influential for the political aesthetics of fascism. 
As the avenue through which the agents of Italian authority crossed the colony at a mechanical 
velocity which ploughed straight through any putative camel caravan, the road was clearly designed 
– among more obvious functions – to encourage Libya’s native inhabitants to internalise the ‘truth’ 
of their supposedly anachronistic way of life, and of the futility of resisting their incorporation, both 
psychic and somatic, into the fascist imperial order. As Balbo declared in 1938: ‘[t]he image of the 
cabila or tribe wandering in the desert at the orders of its chief, according to the ancient traditions 
dating back to the great migrations and the barbarian invasions, will [soon] be no more than a distant 
memory in [Italy’s] new Libyan provinces’.64 
 
2. Space.  
The dual temporality of the Arco/Litoranea, simultaneously ‘classical’ and ‘futurist’, was 
complemented by a spatial rationale which linked together three of Italian fascist imperialism’s most 
distinctive concepts: spazio vitale; imperialismo demografico; and the idea of the quarta sponda, 
which characterized the Libyan coast as Italy’s ‘fourth shore’. In distinct but often overlapping ways, 
all three ideas sought to overlay the formal integration of coastal Libya into Italy in 1939 with a series 
of synthetic images, and in this way to embed the union between state and colony into the affective 
reality of the Mediterranean.  
While fascism may have realised this goal most completely, the idea that Libya had once 
been, and should again be, an integral part of Italy was born much earlier than 1922. Soon after 
Italy’s ‘unification’ (late for European standards) in 1861 with the publication of a series of widely 
disseminated sociological and criminological investigations into the causes of the crippling 
‘backwardness’ of the Mezzogiorno (the Italian South). Studies such as Alfredo Niceforo’s L’Italiana 
barbara contemporanea (‘Contemporary Italian Barbarism’) attributed this backwardness not to 
underdevelopment or traditionalism, but rather to racial inferiority.65 As Lucia Re points out, the 
‘shocking parallels perceived by the criminality, promiscuity, degeneracy, laziness, superstition, and 
squalor of the South and what was thought to be dark, barbaric, unevolved Africa’ came increasingly 
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to be explained on the grounds that Italian Southerners were ‘Southerners were…primitive or “dark” 
Mediterraneans – racially African and Camitic or Semitic’ while Northerners ‘were Aryan or Germanic 
and Slavic’.66 For many, establishing an overseas empire represented the best, if not the only 
solution to the twin problems of Italy’s thwarted great power ambitions and haemorrhaging 
emigration problem – both closely related to the ‘Southern question’. By the last decades of the 
nineteenth century, however, there was little of the world’s surface left to claim, leading one Senator 
lament that ‘the possibility of Italy being completely barred from the Orient and imprisoned in the 
Mediterranean makes [one] think of an animal which…enclosed in an iron circle, kills itself’.67 As the 
Ottoman Empire’s reputation as the ‘sick man of Europe’ solidified, and as its European credentials 
began, in turn, to crumble, Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan, just across ‘our sea’ (according to 
the Roman trope of mare nostrum) offered an obvious ‘solution’ in the form of an imperial outlet for 
Italy’s ‘surplus population’.68 Half a century later, in 1932, the veteran Blackshirt Dino Grandi 
(Ambassador to Britain at the time) was articulating the same lament, though in an updated form: 
Italy, a nation ‘confined and held captive within a closed sea’, was being denied its rightful spazio 
vitale.69  
This narrative of expansionist right stemming from material necessity, almost as old as the 
Italian state itself, was reinforced after 1922 by fascism’s identification as a proletarian project. Yet 
this sensibility, too, had pre-fascist roots. For example, in a famous speech delivered during the 
1911-12 ‘Libyan War’, the poet Enrico Pascoli depicted Italy as la grande Proletaria (‘the great 
Proletarian’).70 This powerful maternal figure, Pascoli declared, had at last ‘found a place’ for the 
workers she was being forced to send abroad:  ‘a vast region bathed by our sea’.71 Pascoli claimed 
that North Africa’s Islamic conquerors had ‘seized’ these territories illegitimately, ‘close[ing] off, 
without cultivating it, land that is necessary and workable for all men, taking bread, foodstuffs, clothes 
and homes from the greater collective’ – i.e. Italy, ‘the great martyr of nations’.72 The conquest of 
‘Libya’ would, Pascoli argued, be doubly transformative: re-civilising these formerly Roman territories 
while simultaneously resolving Italy’s social fragmentation: in the ‘lists of the glorious dead, of the 
wounded, rejoicing in their luminous wounds’ was drawn ‘the entire geography of Italy’.73 Libya as 
‘naught but an extension’ of Italy ‘connected by the familiar sea road’, Pascoli declared, invoking the 
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legend of a lost Roman road said once to have linked Sicily with Tripolitania.74 In Libya, Italians would 
be able to ‘farm their own property, on the soil of the Motherland’, where ‘[t]he laws they voted for 
will safeguard them’. In this way, ‘Libya’ was cast as an amputated limb whose legal reattachment 








Figure 3: Italian artillery in Tripoli during the Italo-Ottoman War, 1911-12. Photo: Bain News Service, courtesy of the 
United States Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division.  
 
Under fascism, this proletarian spatiality morphed into the policy of ‘demographic 
colonialism’, even if, prior to 1931, when the Libyan resistance was finally crushed, this policy met 
with limited success. In 1938, however, a decree was issued, at Balbo’s insistence, articulating a 
plan to settle no less than twenty thousand Italian colonists (the so-called ventimila) in Libya every 
year for five years.75 With the initiation of this policy, the fascist state took full control over the 
settlement of Libya for the first time.76 The land that was allocated, with much fanfare, to the settler 
families who arrived in Libya under its aegis had been appropriated under a series of laws that had 
first been instated in Tripolitania, under the governorship (1921-25) of Giuseppe Volpi. This 
legislation provided for the transferal of all ‘uncultivated’ land to the public domain, and for the 
confiscation of land held by ‘rebels’.77 Just as Pascoli had hoped of the original appropriation of 
Libya, Balbo saw in imperialismo demografico a tool which could craft the Italian state into a 
homogenous whole – this time with a strongly corporatist character. Even the design of the farm 
houses which the settlers found waiting for them was called upon to reflect this objective. 
‘“Traditional” in appearance’ with ‘clear, but non-local references to Italian vernacular[s]’, these 
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houses were designed specifically to emphasise ‘[the] settlers’ belonging to the Italian nation rather 
than to any one region’.78  
Despite the many continuities which, in Libya, connected the imperialism of the 1930s with 
the imperialism of Italy’s liberal era, however, the insistence on the incorporation of coastal Libya 
was distinctively fascist. Where liberal administrations had constructed Libya as Italy’s foil, and 
Libya’s local population as uncivilised intruders, fascism’s aim was to integrate Libya and Libyans 
into a unified Italian space ordered on the basis of hierarchy rather than dialectical opposition. The 
image of Libya as Italy’s ‘fourth shore’ – in addition to its three other Mediterranean (Tyrrhenian, 
Adriatic and Ionian) coasts – was central to this idea,79 anchoring Italy’s ‘right’ to spatial expansion 
not only in the limitations of a territory deemed too small for its vigorously expanding population but 
also in the specific history of the ocean into which the Italian peninsula thrust itself. Reinforced by 
the architectural trope of Mediterraneità, fascist Italy’s imperial vision was one in which its social 
deeply fragmented core territory and scattered imperial possessions could be transformed into a 
single body.  This was an altogether different spatial rationale from that which lay behind the classic 
‘salt water’ model associated with liberal imperialism, in which title to territory was claimed on the 
basis of an insurmountable otherness.  
Under Balbo’s governorship this incorporative logic reached a new extreme with the decision 
to integrate Tripolitania and Cyrenaica fully into metropolitan Italy, while at the same time enhancing 
the legal protections given (in theory) to local customs.80 At Balbo’s behest, a decree of 9 January 
1939 – the ‘crowning piece of legislation in the plan to create a quarta sponda’ – transformed coastal 
Libya into Italy’s nineteenth region.81 This territorially integrationist move was accompanied by a 
parallel series of measures aimed at achieving greater social integration between settlers and 
‘natives’. As the first families of the ventimila set sail on 28 October 1938 (the sixteenth anniversary 
of the March on Rome), they were left in no doubt as to their position at the vanguard of fascism’s 
mission to give ‘proletarian Italy’ an ‘outlet for its exuberant life’.82 Their role in concretising the 
juridical integration of Libya with Italy was captured by the poet Adriano Grande. ‘No one cries any 
more’, Grande wrote, because, ‘The sea is ours / We cross it as if it were a piazza / And where we 
land / We still find Italy’.83  Upon arrival, the settlers found everything waiting for them, from model 
villages to seeds and farming equipment. The process of settlement was overseen by a series of 
colonisation companies, in many cases the very same institutions (such as the National Fascist 
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Institute for Social Security) involved in the reclamation of Italy’s own swamps and other peripheral 
areas. This only underscored, once again, the legal, institutional and spatial relationship between 
Italy’s apparently endless double-project of self-colonisation through colonial conquest.84  
The local population of Libya was not excluded from this process of hierarchical social 
(in)corporatisation. On the contrary, the initiation of ‘intensive demographic colonialism’ coincided 
with the start of a new phase in their relationship with Italy, symbolised by Mussolini’s decision to 
style himself ‘protector of Islam’.85 The inauguration of this new image was, in fact, the primary 
purpose of Mussolini’s second trip to Libya in 1937. This visit reached its climax in a ceremony held 
on 18 March, two days after the unveiling of the Arco and Litoranea.  Urging the crowd to pass on 
his words ‘through your towns and villages, right into the tents of the nomads’, Mussolini proclaimed 
fascist Italy’s wish ‘to demonstrate sympathy towards…Muslims the world over’. ‘Soon, with its laws’ 
declared, ‘Rome will show how anxious it is for your future welfare’.86 Mussolini’s strategy here, 
according to the historian John Wright, was to offer supposedly ‘defenseless Muslims a true “Roman” 
(and thus universal) champion against the pusillanimous colonialism of the two leading Western 
democracies’, Britain and France.87 Accordingly, a new decree was passed extending the privileges 
that had previously been reserved for settlers to ‘natives’, who became eligible to apply for 
government subsidies to fund agricultural reclamation and development projects.88  
These changes to the property law in colonial Libya were mirrored by alterations made to the 
various forms of legal personality that were available to ‘native’ Libyans. Under Balbo’s governorship, 
a new system of ‘parallel’ cultural development was instituted, which maintained pre-existing legal 
protections with respect to language, customs and religion, but replaced protections for ‘tribal’ 
structures with ‘economic and political institutions similar to those of Italian nationals’.89 The similar-
yet-different status of the Italiani mussulmani compared with the settlers (Italiani metropolitani) soon 
came to be legible in the most concrete elements of daily existence. The ‘centres’ that were built for 
‘resettled’ Libyan farmers, for example (many of them by di Fausto),90 presented ‘postcard-perfect 
images of North Africa Settlements’ with their ‘arcades and minarets’. Yet in doing so, as Fuller points 
out, they also reduced these features to their ‘essential signifiers’ which that presented Libya’s Arab 
and Berber population with a series of ‘artificial renderings of the very social configuration [the] 
Italians had uprooted’.91 Then, in 1939, a new law brought into being three classes of Italian citizen 
in Libya. Until that time, full Italian citizenship had been available, upon application, to all of Libya’s 
inhabitants. Now they were divided into cittadini metropolitani (a status available only to Italians); 
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cittadini italiani libici (the default citizenship for ‘natives’); and cittadini italiani speciali. This last 
‘special’ status aimed at fulfilling another of Mussolini’s 1937 pledges: to reward Libyan veterans 
who had been drafted in to fight in the Ethiopian war, and other loyalists,92 in the interests of creating 
‘an elite leadership sympathetic to the Italians’.93 Along with other measures (such as the 
broadcasting of Arabic programmes stressing the ‘benefits of “Roman” justice’ on Radio Bari) the 
fascist administration sought to bring into being ‘the docile cooperation and goodwill of its Muslim 
subjects’, who would occupy a secure but peripheral position within the fascist body corporate ‘as 
workers in the more menial tasks of empire-building, as clerks and minor civil servants in the colonial 
administration, and as soldiers in the increasingly likely event of another world war’.94 With the 
partitioning of vast tracts of land previously used for grazing, ‘shifting cultivation’, suani (oasis 
gardens) and genanat (dry farms), Libya’s new indigenous lease-holders were required by law to 
transform themselves from nomadic subsistence pastoralists (in the main) into settled and integrated 
owners and exchangers of private property. The devastating effects on the delicately balanced pre-
1911 subsistence system and social order supplemented those of fascism’s brutal final push for 
dominance in Libya, completed six years earlier, with the use of tactics from public hangings to 
starvation to appalling concentration camps.95 According to some estimates, barely 50 percent of 
Cyrenaica’s pre-1922 Bedouin population remained alive by the time of Mussolini’s offer of 
‘protection’.96  
What connection, then, did these changes have with the nexus between the Arco and the 
Litoranea? According to the historian Caudio Segré, ‘[t]he construction of the Litoranea Libica was 
the physical counterpart of [the] administrative unity’ brought about by coastal Libya’s rhetorical and 
legal transformation into Italy’s ‘fourth shore’.97 Viewed against the background of these legal 
changes, the Arch/Litoranea offered a joint symbol of the distinctive integrated-yet-segregated 
spatial logic of social life in fascist Libya. Roaring through the Arch, a passenger in the late 1930s 
would have seen an inscription and a carved panel on either side of her flash past – one celebrating 
the completion of the road; the other the founding of the ‘New Roman Empire’ (see Fig. 2). The first 
panel showed ‘the land surveyors with their pith helmets and their drawings in the foreground’; in the 
background, ‘Arab workmen with sledge-hammers, stone-crushing machinery and the mineral-
railway trucks’. Behind them was ‘a camel-train bringing water in barrels’. The foreground of the 
panel opposite, meanwhile, was ‘occupied by the Duce…at the head of his troops, saluting the Re 
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Imperatore (Vittorio Emanuele III)’. Behind the King were ‘the Hills of Rome with their monuments’ 








Figure 4: Villagio Cesare Battisti, Tripolitania, designed by Florestano di Fausto, 1 Jan. 1934. Source: Wikicommons.  
 
The passenger would have been confronted, in other words, with a fleeting image in which 
agriculture and industry, metropole and colony, Arab labourer and Italian farmer, had been first 
constituted and then assembled as the integrated parts of a single socio-territorial machine. Had that 
passenger been the father of a settler family, the journey through the Arch (perhaps in a tractor) 
would have mirrored the spatial and legal changes that had just transformed him – almost overnight 
– from an impoverished sharecropper into a landowning farmer of the kind depicted on the carved 
panels at his flank. Indeed, as one enthusiastic visitor from the mainland described this territorial and 
social metamorphosis, the ‘reclamation’ of Libya had shifted Italian braccianti (day-labourers) up to 
the status of contadini (peasants), leaving the position of braccianti vacant for native Libyans to 
occupy themselves. Observing the settlers’ adoption of local styles of dress and multiple dialects 
‘blending into a local patois’ garnished with Arabic words and customs, it could at last be said, he 
continued, that Italians had formed themselves into a ‘new race’ – at once ‘Mussolini’s race, [a] 
fascist race, [a] colonial race’.99 Had the passenger in question been a soldier (trundling through in 
an armoured vehicle), or a tourist (speeding through in a motorcar), meanwhile, they would certainly 
have felt dwarfed by the sheer scale of the Arch, while at the same time exhilarated at the speed at 
which it disappeared as they sped away along the smooth new asphalt. The message – that of the 
absolute superiority of the collective over the individual – was clear. 
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The first two sections of this article have unpacked some of the ways in which fascist legality was 
expressed in and reflected back from the physicality of colonial Libya, and from the intersection 
between the Arch and the road specifically. We have seen how the passage through the Arch was, 
like so much of fascist life, a carefully staged experience, designed to reinforce the juridical changes 
though which the Mussolini regime was then attempting to create a new set of hierarchically-ordered, 
synthetic legal subjectivities for Libya, Italy, and the world at large. On the surface, then, fascism’s 
peculiarly ‘monist’ approach to law (international, colonial and domestic) could not be more distinct 
from doctrinal international legal thinking today, grounded as the latter is continues to be in a formally 
equal notion of subjectivity operating through a set of separate but equivalent scales (‘sovereign’ 
states, ‘self-determining’ peoples, individual bearers of ‘universal human rights’ and so on).100 If this 
is the case, we might ask whether fascism’s experiments have anything at all to tell us about the 
relationship between doctrinal international law today and the kind of violence which Libya has been 
forced to experience on its path away from fascist colonialism towards ‘sovereign statehood’?  
I will use this section to suggest that, for all its pomposity and viciousness, fascism’s officials, 
lawyers and philosophers accepted a truth about the concept of self-determining subjectivity or 
‘sovereignty’, its logic and its material effects – a logic which present-day doctrinal international law 
denies. Like the architects of Libia Italiana’s villages, monuments and roads, the engineers of 
fascism’s peculiar corporatist-monist approach to domestic, colonial and international law 
understood that the connection between individual and international (legal) subjectivity was not 
merely ‘analogous’ (as the doctrine of international law assumes with its image of the state as 
individual ‘writ large’101) but rather enforceable, interpellative and constitutive. In short, my 
suggestion will be that the act of thinking about and treating the state as macro version of the ‘free’ 
and ‘equal’ individual (the ‘domestic analogy’, whether in its fascist or liberal form) has predictable 
and deleterious effects on the distribution of wealth, power and pleasure – effects which fascism 
(and fascist international law) accepted and celebrated, but which liberalism (and liberal/present-day 
doctrinal international law) continues reject, if not consciously to obscure.   
The crucial correspondence here concerns fascism’s notorious state fetishism – a fetishism 
which international law shares wholeheartedly, if rather less stridently. In its doctrinal international 
legal form, this fetish is formally and very strictly egalitarian. Thus, while other, lesser ‘international 
personalities’ may exist, only states can be ‘full’ subjects of international law, possessed of the 
complete set of ‘sovereign’ rights and duties (including law-making powers) which cannot be 
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‘restricted’ in the absence of explicit consent, except in very exceptional circumstances (with the 
recent emergence of so-called jus cogens norms).102  By contrast, inter-war fascism attributed to the 
state a quasi-mystical capacity to surpass the temporal and spatial limits of individual existence by 
condensing the subjectivities of all ‘men’ into one – or, rather, into a hierarchy of ‘ones’, each of them 
nation-states with material capacities and therefore different sets of rights.  
According to Mussolini, for instance – in a widely-read exposition published in the January 
1935 edition of International Conciliation, the journal of the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace – the state was not a ‘mere mechanical device for defining the sphere within which the 
individual may duly exercise his supposed rights’, as assumed by the liberal understanding of the 
‘rule of law’, but ‘an inwardly accepted standard’, the ‘soul of the soul’.103 It was the state, he insisted, 
which allowed ‘man’ to ‘[transcend] the brief limits of individual life’ by sublimating ‘his’ subjectivity in 
its collective, eternal ‘personality’.104 Deploying a favourite Futurist trope, Mussolini described this 
‘spiritualised’ capacity as an ‘intuition’,105 through which the state was able to connect the ‘living 
reality of the present’ together with ‘the past and above all with the future’, and in this way to lead 
‘men from primitive tribal life to that highest expression of human power which is Empire’.106 As in 
Boccioni’s celebration of Futurist intuition, fascist theory took for granted that the temporal and spatial 
dynamic of international ‘personality’ was one of inexorable expansion – an expansion, indeed, that 
fascist Italy soon set about realising through its annexation of the Ethiopian Empire  (1936), Albania 
(1939), parts of Yugoslavia (1941) and elsewhere. Woven through this fascist conception of the 
citizen, the state, the empire and even of the ‘family of nations’ was a corporatist understanding of 
liberty or self-determination: the integration of the individual into the ‘state hierarchy’ was said to 
enhance (rather than to diminish) ‘[h]is freedom to act’, which, ‘no longer restricted to the sphere of 
private interests’, could ‘now assert itself within the entire social system’.107  
Transposing this theory of individual subjectivity to the international realm, fascist jurists and 
diplomats embarked on the project of reorganising the global order along hierarchical lines just as 
Italian society was  being reorgnaised domestically.108 Prior to its withdrawal from the League of 
Nations in 1937, for instance, Italy repeatedly denounced the ‘absurdity’ of the ‘principle of absolute 
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juridical parity among all States’, as codified in the Covenant,109 on the grounds that states were 
‘differentiated…by their historical responsibilities’.110 Only if the League were ‘properly directed by a 
master hand’ would it ‘rise from its present impotence to give decisiveness and prestige to itself and 
tranquility to the international system’.111 Having failed in its efforts to ‘reform’ the League (which it 
abandoned in 1937 in the wake of the ‘Abyssinia Crisis’), Italy attempted to bring this new, 
hierarchical world order into being in collaboration first with Nazi Germany in the 1939 ‘Pact of 
Steel’112 and then with both Germany  and Imperial Japan in the ‘Tripartite Pact’ of 1940 (later joined 
by Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Croatia and nearly also by Thailand).113 The objectives of 
these states in concluding these treaties was explicitly that of ‘striv[ing] with united effort for the 
securing of their spazzio vitale/Lebensraum and the maintenance of peace’,114 and of establishing 
in this way a ‘new order’ in Europe, led by Italy and Germany, and another in Asia, led by Japan.115  
This project was, of course, eventually terminated upon the victory of the ‘united nations’ in 1945 
(although it should be recalled that this victory was secured not only by enormous Western European 
military sacrifices and American capital, but also by the gigantic scale of the resources deployed by 
the Soviet Union, then firmly in the grip of Josef Stalin; by the carpet-bombing of German cities by 
Allied forces; and by the world’s first and only use of nuclear weapons against Japan).  However, 
when observed from the perspective of those communities which found themselves in fascist, 
occupied and/or collaborationist Africa, Europe, Asia and the Pacific between 1922 and 1945 (from 
the perspective of ‘native’ Libyans, for example), it would be difficult to write that ‘new order’ off as a 
complete failure.  
Once again, however, it is important to keep in mind that this fascist internationalist dream 
did not come from nowhere. The idea that territorial expansion was the necessary corollary of truly 
‘sovereign’ statehood, for instance, had long been a familiar aspect of the logic of liberal diplomatic 
relations before fascism arrived on the scene (as we have already seen in the Italian context). For 
instance, when the British imperialist, entrepreneur and statesman Cecil Rhodes declared in 1895 
that ‘in order to save the forty million inhabitants of the United Kingdom from a bloody civil war, we 
colonial statesmen must acquire new lands for settling the surplus population, to provide new 
markets for the goods produced in factories and mines’,116 he only articulated, for Britain, something 
that was obvious to all of Europe’s imperial ‘sovereign equals’.117 The legitimising rationale of fascist 
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expansionism was, in other words, identical to that of European imperialism, but for one thing: 
fascism’s willingness to annex ‘sovereign’, European territory (as well as less-than-sovereign, extra-
European territory) in order to obtain the resources deemed ‘vital’ to its continued existence. With 
this willingness, fascism manifested its contempt not only for the axiom of sovereign equality but also 
for the international law’s ‘unrealistic’ Europhilism.118 It also shattered the white supremacism which 
underpinned the European colonial project into a far more complex but equally brutal hierarchy of 
racial supremacy, according not only Africans, Arabs and Indigenous peoples but also European 
Jews, Slavs, Roma and others could legitimately be subordinated and, if necessary, liquidated.119 
Today, by contrast, and as noted at the start, colonialism is considered wholly illegitimate as 
a matter of international law.120 However, the arrival of the customary right of peoples to self-
determination in the late-twentieth century meant that satiating the ‘vital needs’ of a state’s 
increasingly numerous or wealthy population (more commonly referred to, today, in terms of a 
healthily expanding ‘domestic market’) by means of territorial expansion is no longer a legitimate 
option (whether beyond or within Europe), the same does not apply when it comes to the state’s right 
to capture of resources other than land for the same purpose. On the contrary, the idea that an 
available ‘supply’ of ‘natural resources’ coupled with the ‘demand’ associated with a national 
population’s burgeoning wants and needs constitutes an enforceable ‘right’ to expansion into 
‘emerging markets’ to which almost any form of opposition (in the form, say, of tariffs or quotas) is 
prohibited constitutes the bedrock assumption of the contemporary international trade and 
investment regime. That regime’s institutions have been endowed with effective channels for 
countering such resistance in the form of the state-state and investor-state dispute mechanisms, for 
example in the World Trade Organisation, the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement and the 
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP11).121 Only the most 
powerful states – those with the biggest ‘markets’ and the largest reservoirs of resources – can get 
away with resisting some of the rules they so rigorously enforce amongst their peers.122 
Approached from a twenty-first century doctrinal starting-point, the inexorably expansionist 
logic (from colonialism to neo-colonialism) of international law’s core subject, the self-determining or 
sovereign state, is difficult to see. According to the treaties, custom and case law that regulate the 
coming-into-being and ‘intercourse’ of states under international law, it is simply a fact of life in the 
‘internationa community’ that some communities happen to be sovereign states, possessed of an 
‘external’ right to self-determination, while others just happen to exist within theose states, protected 
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by the ‘internal’ equivalent of that right.123 With these rights in place, borders can be assumed to 
remain ‘defined’, populations ‘permanent’, and states ‘peace-loving’ at heart.124 In practice, however, 
the pattern according to which rights of ‘external’ and ‘internal’ self-determination have come to be 
distributed among the world’s communities and territoires is neither random nor neutral. Instead (as 
Marxist, ‘Third World’, Indigenous, queer and feminist legal scholars continue to argue), this pattern 
has been determined, over the course of five centuries, by the accumulation and distribution of 
resources – most obviously, ‘natural’, economic, financial and technical resources, but also, and just 
as importantly, the many other forms of epistemological capital (as we might call it), deriving from 
the racist, gendered, heteronormative and other discriminatory structures which continue to order 
our everyday lives.125  
What a chronotopic investigation into fascist material practices of colonialism and international 
law contributes to this critique is a slight change in focus, from the origins of inequality to its 
mechanisms of perpetuation. In a world in which the only subjective relationship with any normative 
value is that between the individual and the state (conceived as a macro individual), there is, after 
all, only one way to overcome the physical limit which death – mortality – places on ‘true’ self-
determination. This is, of course, through the establishment of a ‘bloodline’: procreation; the founding 
of a family; then a tribe; then a ‘nation’ and ultimately the formation of a nation-state. This means, of 
course, that the extension of self-determining subjectivity in time must go hand-in-hand with the 
expansion of self-determining subjectivity in space, as generations multiply and begin to find 
themselves in competition for resources. This trajectory, with its ‘survival of the fittest’ logic, was 
axiomatic for Mussolini, Boccioni, Rhodes – for inter-war Futurists and fascists and pre-war 
imperialists generally, as we have seen.  
But which view is correct? Is the ‘international community’ a stable global patchwork collection 
of sovereign equals, comfortably producing and exchanging resources with one another in order to 
provide for the material needs of their ‘fixed’ populations?126 Or is contemporary international legal 
order better characterised as a vast accumulation of annexations, colonisations, peace treaties and 
boundary agreements, whose unspoken violence and suppressed tensions are inexplicably absent 
from doctrine to which international lawyers direct themselves when working out questions of 
jurisdiction, sovereignty and responsibility?127  
To respond to this question, let me return, one last time, to this article’s comparison between the 
physical dimensions and repercussions of point 30°31'00"N, 18°34'00"E in 1937 (the Arch/Litoranea 
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nexus) and its physical dimensions and their repercussions in the years since 2011 (the disputed 
Ra’s Lanuf refinery and its surroundings). If we assume that Libya is, indeed, the ‘sovereign equal’ 
of every other state in the international community (including those which regularly continue to carry 
out air strikes within its territory), then the chronotopes of this point at these two moments, eight 
decades apart, do seem to be very different from one another. As I argued in Section 1, the 
temporality of fascist legality was a double-temporality, simultaneously circling back to the purported 
universalism of classical antiquity (symbolised by the arch-ness and kitchy eclecticism of the Arco) 
and dragging ‘anachronous’ aspects the ‘now’ of the late 1930s into a violently accelerating future 
(the epitome of which was the technical spectacle of the Litoranea itself). By contrast, the temporality 
of international legality today is typically narrated, in the doctrine of international law, as singular, 
linear and progressive; as a long chain of ‘breaks’ and ‘renewals’ in which the past is continually 
being left behind in order to validate the present.128 In spatial terms, meanwhile, as I outlined in 
Section 2, the legal thinking and practice of fascist Italy was concerned with the incorporation of 
those peoples it had drawn within Italian jurisdiction into an integrated, macro-micro hierarchy of 
subjects, domestic, colonial and international – a story retold in the extended route of the Litoranea 
and in the Arch’s decorations. By contrast, I suggested that the spatiality of orthodox international 
thinking today operates, in theory, on the basis of independent formal equality – even when, in 
Libya’s case, a full-scale military intervention, only tenuously consensual, is in the process of being 
authorised and executed.129  
Fascist subjects, meanwhile, were, as we saw, differentiated in terms of their rights and duties 
on the basis of assumptions about their physical and psychological attributes, corresponding to the 
particular degree of deference expected of them towards fascism’s corporatist legal order. In colonial 
Libya, for example (as the Arch’s reliefs illustrated), the bottom rungs of the socio-legal ladder were 
occupied by dominated colonial subjects; the middle rungs by obedient settlers (farming families and 
workers); while the top rung was inhabited by men like Grandi, Balbo and, of course, Mussolini, the 
leader of the all the Blackshirts. It was upon their supposedly virile, aggressive, disciplined-yet-
audacious subjectivity that the ideal of the ultra-fascist ‘new man’ was modelled, just as it was in the 
‘macro’ version of this ‘personality’, imagined as being embodied in the super-sovereign fascist state 
itself. In its most potent manifestations, then, the leading subjects of the fascist legal imagination 
were unashamedly violent, hierarchical and expansionist.130 By contrast, international law’s subjects, 
micro and macro, are all, in theory, equally free, pacific and orderly.131  
Which of these two visions of subjectivity corresponds most closely to that which point 
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30°31'00"N, 18°34'00"E (2011 ff) calls into being and reflects back? Let us think through this question 
chronotopically once again. Spatially, this ‘location’ is today largely off limits to all but the allies of 
whichever militia, security force or army happens to have successfully fought off its contenders. 
Many of these are implacably hostile either to the international community’s plans for Libya’s future 
(as with Haftar’s Libyan National Army), or indeed (as with IS) to the ‘dazzling and deceptive slogans’ 
they attribute to international law per se.132 As the images broadcast back from this point by bullet-
proofed war photographers reveal (see Fig. 5), the contrast between the state-of-the art oil refinery 
(constructed in and through a multitude of international contracts between the Libyan state and 
various multinational companies) and its devastated surroundings is, indeed, nothing short of 
‘dazzling’.133 Conduct an image search for ‘Ra’s Lanuf’ and one can see the refinery’s narrow 
concrete chimneys, swathed in pale-green rigging, shimmering in the heat a mile or so back from 
the remains of the Litoranea, surrounded by a skid-marked desert strewn with rubbish and shrapnel. 
This juxtaposition, it might be argued, offers a graphic illustration of the mismatch between 
international law’s doctrinal expectations about Libya’s subjectivity as a ‘sovereign state’ recently 
liberated from authoritarianism on the one hand, and the material reality of Libya’s century-long 
‘transition’ towards sovereign equality on the other.  
We might begin, here, by noting that, just as fascist Italy set out legally to incorporate coastal 
Libya into the ‘motherland’ as Italy’s ‘fourth shore’, so the aim of Operation Unified Protector was 
explicitly that of ‘integrat[ing] Libya fully into the 21st-century world economy in transparent ways 
where Libya's oil wealth is used for the benefit of all of Libya's citizens’, by a different mechanism: 
that of ‘privatising some of [its] state monopolies’.134 Underpinning the legitimacy of this twenty-first 
century incorporative project was the presumed (or, one might say, ‘intuited’) desire of the Libyan 
people to participate as equals in the global economy (routinely depicted as the primary aim of the 
‘Arab Spring’ uprising of 2011 in general).135 To be a ‘free’ and ‘equal’ individual within a ‘sovereign’ 
state was the universal ‘birthright of every man, woman and child’, as US Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton asserted in March 2011 when making the case for intervention before the UN Human Rights 
Council.136 Released from Qaddafi’s peculiar and deeply authoritarian form of socialism (described 
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in the New York Times as ‘a mixture of utopian socialism, Arab nationalism…[and] Third World 
revolutionary ideology…with a streak of Bedouin supremacism’ 137), Libya was expected, in 2011, to 
rise from the flames fully equipped with ‘democratic processes and institutions, good governance, 
rule of law, national reconciliation and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms’.138  When 
we look at photographs of Ra’s Lanuf today, it is this vision of the ‘free’ and ‘equal’ Libyan citizen 
which the looming presence of Ra’s Lanuf refinery (and its anxious but invisible international 
investors) demands.139  
However, as the bleak landscape that surrounds the refinary’s burned-out tanks and abandoned 
buildings cannot bears witness, that demand continues to echo out across desert without a reply – 
or, at least, without the reply it was expecting. Libya and Libyans have not, it seems, taken up the 
opportunity that was offered to them by the ‘international community’.  Far from lining up at the door 
of the refinery to offer their labour ‘freely’ to the global economy, many of them have been compelled 
either to join one of the militias or to flee from them to Europe or elsewhere. This was not, however, 
part of the plan. State populations, after all, are meant to be ‘settled’. Having been re-constituted as 
the subjects of a ‘real’ – market – democracy that is supposed to (as Clinton explained) ‘deliver 
results for [its] citizens’,140 Libyans are expected look to their own elected representatives to provide 
them with a ‘level playing field’ upon which to compete, on formally equal terms, for the world’s 
resources (including their own). Having been liberated not only from fascism and colonialism but 
now also from socialism, Libyans citizens are, naturally, prohibited from competing on someone 
else’s pitch. So, too, are the millions of other citizens who are fleeing, likewise, through Libya, from 
poverty and violence in Syria, Iraq, Bangladesh, Côte d’Ivoire and elsewhere.141  
These so-called ‘economic migrants’ are cast as alien intruders by many of Libya’s fellow 
sovereign states, including those who participated so enthusiastically in Operation Unified 
Protector.142 Having disembarked from the Tripolitanian or Cyrenaican coast (in some cases, from 
the Ra’s Lanuf terminal itself143), tens of thousands of individuals – aspiring settlers moving in the 
wrong direction along the mythical Roman road – are once again being accused of ‘taking bread, 
foodstuffs, clothes and homes from the greater collective’.144 This time, however, their theft arises 
not only from their historic occupation of land without cultivating it (or, in this case, without extracting 
oil from it) efficiently, but also and more recently from their efforts to escape the damage and chaos 
into which that land has gradually been thrust in the name of their own individual and collective 
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Figure 5: A revolutionary and a refinery confront the fallout. Ra’s Lanuf, 2011. Photo © Benjamin Lowy/Getty Images. 
Ironically (or perhaps not) one consequence of what the ‘refugee crisis’ has been a strong 
resurgence of support for the supposedly outdated and discarded judicial and political institutions of 
fascism.146 This is not, however, the connection between ‘colonial’ and ‘free’ Libya that I want to draw 
attention to. The more salient connection, I suggest concerns the hierarchical position that 
contemporary Libya continues to occupy, not just in spite of but because of the formal egalitarian of 
the international community into which it has just been so violently (re)integrated. The rationale 
behind that violence and that hierarchy are clear: if competitive ‘free’ and ‘equal’ individuality within 
a ‘sovereign’ state really is the ‘birthright of every man, woman and child’,147 then Libya’s ongoing 
‘failure’ as a sovereign state can only stem,148 not from the intervention itself, but rather from Libyans’ 
failure to manifest the maturity and rationality  that are deemed necessary to ‘reject violence, uphold 
equality, and…play by the rules of democracy’.149 This is indeed the message which Libya and 
Libyans have been receiving from the ‘international community’ as the civil war continues. At a 
summit in mid-2015, for example, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the UK and the US urged ‘all Libyan 
decision makers to show in this crucial moment [the] responsibility, leadership and courage’ 
necessary to sign the Skhirat Agreement, then in the process of being drafted by the UN’s (Italian) 
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Special Representative to Libya, Bernardino Léon.150 When the ‘international community’ 
reconvened in Paris on 2 October 2016 to address the ongoing crisis, representatives from Egypt, 
Germany, Italy, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Spain Turkey UAE, UK and the USA’ were present, along with 
‘UN Special Envoy Martin Kobler and EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini’. No Libyans, 
however, had been invited. When questioned on this point, ‘French officials’ suggested it had been 
an accidental oversight resulting from ‘the rapid organising of the event’.151   
 
Conclusion: Empire.  
This essay has compared the material dimensions of the location marked by the coordinate 
30°31'00"N, 18°34'00"Eat two different moments in time, offering this comparison up as a sobering 
example of international law’s failure to shake off the legacy of European imperialism. Beyond this, 
however, I have also sought to suggest that the specifically fascist imperial history of this ‘imperial 
location’ reveals something particular about the relationship between international law and violence. 
This ‘something’ concerns the inherently expansionist logic which animates international law’s 
‘sovereign’ subjects. As Libya’s experience illustrates only too vividly, these subjects relate to each 
other not as ‘peace-loving’ neighbours of equal standing, but instead as rivals and predators. The 
problem, of course – a problem which fascism accepted as a fact of ‘sovereign’ life, but which 
present-day international legal doctrine is reluctant to confront – is that states cannot all be permitted 
to ‘grow’ in this way, whether through territorial conquest or through the ‘liberalisation’ of their 
‘access’ to an increasing array of ‘resources’, from newly ‘formalised’ Third World ‘housing markets’ 
to ‘indigenous knowledge’ and beyond. 
It is this expansionist logic, I suggest, which constitutes the precise connection between the 
spatio-temporality of 30°31'00"N, 18°34'00"E in 1937, and the subjects which were interpellated by 
that spatio-temporality under the fascist regime, and the temporal, spatial and subjective features of 
point 30°31'00"N, 18°34'00"E today. One may have been frighteningly orderly, impeccably groomed 
and ‘colonial’. The other may be physically devastated, frighteningly chaotic and ‘sovereign’. 
Nonetheless, in a context in which expansion has always been, by definition, the only route to a form 
of statehood that ‘delivers’, both the previous life and the contemporary existence this ‘imperial 
location’ offer concrete reminders of what it has meant, for Libya and Libyans, to become contestants 
in a zero-sum game which they cannot win, but will never be permitted to lose.  
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